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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Appellate Division, Third Department, rules that injury-in-fact
triggers insurance coverage under comprehensive general liability
policy in New York when property damage is caused by hazardous
material leakage
The general rule in New York regarding the triggering event
for an "occurrence"-based comprehensive general liability ("CGL")
insurance policy1 is that an occurrence takes place, not at the time
of the causative act or omission, but rather at the time when in-
jury or damage occurred.2 Injury or damage that falls outside the
period during which the policy was in effect is not covered.3 Deter-
1 The standard comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policy has been "rou-
tinely used by the insurance industry in the United States." Abex Corp. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying New York law). It includes
definitions, conditions, exclusions, persons insured, liability limitations, and construc-
tion guidelines, and "is said to encompass or to exclude from coverage just about every
known or unknown risk." 1 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
§ 4:7[f], at 325 (6th ed. 1990). It was first formulated in 1940 and has been refined
during the past fifty years. See John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Cov-
erage for "Property Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REV.
943, 946 (1986). In 1986 the Insurance Services Office revised the standard CGL pol-
icy and began distributing two new forms called "commercial" general liability poli-
cies, one written on an "occurrance" basis, the other on a "claims made" basis. Kirk A.
Pasich, Insurance Coverage for the Asbestos Building Cases: There's More Than Prop-
erty Damage, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 630, 649 n.7 (1989) (citing D. MALECKI & A.
FLrrNER, CoMMECIAL GENERAL LIaBIr 1 (2d ed. 1986)).
2 See 68 N.Y. JuR. 2D Insurance § 683 (1988) ("[The generally accepted rule is
that in absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the time of occurrence of an
accident is... when the complaining party was actually damaged, and that therefore
no coverage under the policy exists if the [accident] occurs after the termination of the
policy.") (citations omitted).
3 See id. A CGL policy can be written either as a "claims made" or an "occurrence"
policy. 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, § 11:7[a], at 291. Under a claims made policy, some-
times referred to as a "discovery" policy, coverage is triggered upon the filing of a
claim by an injured party against the insured. Id. Thus, if the claim is not filed during
the period in which the policy is in effect, the insured is not covered. Id.
Occurrence based CGL policies define an occurrence as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in... property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. .. ." 3 FREEDMAN,
supra note 1, app. N at 467-68. Property damage is defined as:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during
the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting
therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physi-
cally injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occur-
rence during the policy period.
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mining the point at which injury or damage occurs, and insurance
coverage is triggered, has been the source of a great deal of contro-
versy in courts across the United States.4 Four distinct trigger
theories have emerged out of this controversy:5 the exposure the-
ory,6 the manifestation or discovery theory, 7 the injury-in-fact the-
Id. at 468.
While it would seem that the difference between claims made and occurrence pol-
icies is clear, this may not be so. "[Very few 'claims made' policies are pure claims-
made, and some insurers have required that both the claim and the occurrence must
occur during the policy period, a veritable hybrid that only further complicates the
issue." 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, § 11:7[a], at 291 (emphasis added). In such in-
stances, however, courts generally agree "that insurance policies are to be construed
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer .... "Van Wyck Assoc.
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 Misc. 2d 447, 451, 454 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1982), aff'd, 95 A.D.2d 989, 464 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2d Dep't 1983).
Furthermore, courts recognize that "'[i]nsured parties and insurers alike can be ex-
pected to behave according to their perceived self-interest[s] by asserting in any par-
ticular litigation the theory that best suits their purposes.'" Continental Casualty Co.
v. Rapid-American Corp., 177 A.D.2d 61, 70, 581 N.Y.S.2d 669, 674 (1st Dep't 1992)
(quoting American Home Prods. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1503
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984)), aff'd, 80 N.Y.2d 640, 609 N.E.2d
506, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1993).
4 See Arness & Eliason, supra note 1, at 947. "[P]roperty damage coverage dis-
putes... focus on three issues: (1) what was the substance that allegedly caused the
injury and exactly what injury was caused; (2) does the fact situation... allege prop-
erty damage under the policy... in question; and (3)... when did the occurrence of
property damage take place?" Id. (citation omitted). When making a factual inquiry
regarding the time of occurrence, courts must be cognizant of the type of substance
that caused the injury. Id. "Asbestos in a building behaves very differently from...
toxic waste gradually leaking from barrels in a landfill onto adjoining property.
Courts must recognize that no single rule can apply to all substances or even to all
types of injuries from any one substance." Id. at 947-48.
5 See James E. Scheuermann, The Injury in Fact Theory as a Solution to the Trig-
ger of Coverage Issue, 24 TORT & INs. L.J. 763, 764 (1989) ("To date, federal and state
courts have adopted four distinct solutions to this problem and there is no sign that
any one of them will be settled on as authoritative."); accord Frona M. Powell, Insur-
ing Environmental Cleanup: Triggering Coverage for Environmental Property Dam-
age Under the Terms of a Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 71 NEB.
L. REv. 1194, 1207-22 (1992) (discussing triggering of liability in property damage
cases); Jonathan P. Saxton, Pitting the Insurer Against the Insured: Litigating Insur-
ance Coverage Issues Arising Out of Environmental Claims, 20 N. Ky. L. REv. 141,
154-57 (1992) (discussing four types of "triggers of coverage").
6 See Saxton, supra note 5, at 154. The exposure theory maintains that coverage
is triggered when the injured party is first exposed to the cause of the damage. See
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 984
(8th Cir.) (holding that, under Missouri law, environmental damage occurs at moment
when hazardous waste is released into environment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821
(1988); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218-
20 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that, in asbestos cases, insurance coverage is triggered
upon inhalation of asbestos fibers), aff'd on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Colonial Realty Co., 121 Misc. 2d 640, 641,
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ory,8 and the continuous or triple trigger theory.9 Recently, in
468 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801-02 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983) (holding in lead poisoning
case that coverage is triggered upon exposure through ingestion of lead paint chips by
infant).
7 See Saxton, supra note 5, at 155. Under the manifestation theory, coverage is
deemed triggered when the injury or damage becomes apparent, that is, when diagno-
sis is possible in bodily injury cases or when damage is discoverable in property dam-
age cases. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1982) (holding in asbestos exposure case that "disease resulted [and coverage was
triggered] when [the injured person] had symptoms which impaired [his or her] sense
of well-being, or when a doctor was able to detect sufficient scarring to make a progno-
sis that the onset of manifested disease was inevitable"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028
(1983); see also Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir.
1986) ("[W]e hold that in hazardous waste burial cases ... the occurrence is judged by
the time at which the leakage and damage are first discovered.").
8 See Scheuermann, supra note 5, at 768. The injury-in-fact theory provides that
coverage is triggered when the injury or damage actually occurs, irrespective of
whether the injury or damage coincides with the time of initial exposure to the ele-
ment causing the harm, and regardless of when the injury or damage was discovered
or could have been discovered. See Savoy Medical Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg. Corp., 776
F. Supp. 703, 709-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that plain meaning of policy lan-
guage and interest of justice require adoption of injury-in-fact rule even though mani-
festation theory might provide greater certainty in determining exact time of occur-
rence in hazardous waste cases); Matychak v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 181 A.D.2d 957,
958, 581 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (3d Dep't) ("[B]y its very terms, the policy does not require
that a 'loss' occur during the policy period; an 'occurrence' is sufficient."), appeal de-
nied, 80 N.Y.2d 758, 602 N.E.2d 1125, 589 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1992).
In Savoy, the court acknowledged that the injury-in-fact rule may result in
greater insurance coverage. Savoy, 776 F. Supp. at 710 ("[Although the insured does
not maintain a policy at the time of discovery, the insurer will nevertheless be liable
for an occurrence which took place during the period of coverage.") The court, how-
ever, found this to be preferable to the alternative:
It may be argued that the manifestation rule of Mraz provides increased
certainty, and thus decreased administrative costs. Undoubtedly, to some
extent, that is true because the actual date of pollution will not necessarily
have to be discovered. However, the benefits of certainty do not always over-
ride the interests ofjustice. The parties clearly intended the policy to cover
instances when damage occurred. Under Mraz, an insured may be forced to
pay costs which were truly bargained for in a given policy, and thus reflected
in higher premiums ....
Id. "Courts that adopt the [injury-in-fact] theory rest their holdings squarely on the
language of the CGL policy itself. In more emphatic form, a court will declare that the
[injury-in-fact] theory is required by the 'plain language' or 'plain meaning' of the
CGL policy." Scheuermann, supra note 5, at 771 (citations omitted).
9 See Saxton, supra note 5, at 156. Under the continuous trigger theory, coverage
is triggered upon the first instance of exposure to the injurious or damaging agent,
injury-in-fact, or manifestation of the injury or damage. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding in asbestos exposure case
that triggering event can be inhalation exposure, development of disease, or manifes-
tation of disease), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); see also Montrose Chem. Corp. of
Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 369 (Cal. Ct. App.) ("If... the trial
court concludes there is a potential for coverage in one or more of the actions under
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Cortland Pump & Equipment, Inc. v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of
Newark,'0 the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that
"injury-in-fact" triggers coverage under CGL policies when prop-
erty damage results from contamination by hazardous
materials.'-
In Cortland, the plaintiff ("Cortland"), in accordance with its
service agreement with Petr-Al Petroleum Consulting Corpora-
tion ("Petr-All"), was called upon to repair a gasoline pump at a
Petr-All gasoline station that was damaged on July 1, 1989 when
a Petr-All customer drove his vehicle away from the station while
the gasoline pump's nozzle was still inserted in the vehicle's fuel
tank.' 2 On March 28, 1990, the owners of two homes located next
to the gasoline station discovered gas fumes on their properties
and thereafter commenced actions against Petr-All for trespass,
nuisance, and loss of use of their residences.'- Petr-All in turn
commenced third-party actions against Cortland in both suits and
thereafter instituted a direct action against Cortland for dam-
ages.' 4 Pursuant to its CGL policy, which was in effect from July
31, 1988 to July 31, 1989, Cortland requested that its insurer, de-
fendant Firemen's Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey
("Firemen's"), defend and indemnify it with respect to all three of
the actions. 15  Firemen's denied coverage, however, on the
grounds that the damage was discovered after the policy ex-
one or more of Admiral's policies, then Admiral is obligated to provide a ... defense to
Montrose .... .") (emphasis omitted), petition for review granted, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal.
1992); Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(holding in pesticide migration case that "where there was a continuing injury, there
was also a continuing trigger of coverage to the extent injury occurred during a policy
period.").
10 194 A.D.2d 117, 604 N.Y.S.2d 633 (3d Dep't 1993), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d
760, 640 N.E.2d 147, 616 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1994).
11 Id. at 121, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636 ("[T]he injury-in-fact standard should be ap-
plied to the property damage, a continuous occurrence resulting from plaintiff's al-
leged negligence which permits a finding that the property damage occurred during
the policy period").
12 Id. at 118, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635. Cortland's repairman failed to perform a test
that would have disclosed a cracked underground joint that allegedly caused gasoline
to flow into the ground and onto the property of two adjacent homeowners. Id. at 119,
604 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
13 Id.
14 Id. On April 2, 1990, the Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC")
also notified Petr-All that it considered Petr-All responsible for the seepage and re-
quested that the company take specific measures to contain and remove the hazard-
ous material. Id.
15 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 119, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
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pired. 6 Cortland brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
to establish Firemen's duty to defend and indemnify.' 7 The trial
court granted Firemen's motion for summary judgment, stating
that the CGL policy was not in effect when the damage was dis-
covered, and thus, Firemen's had no duty to defend.' 8 Cortland
appealed this decision. 19
In a four-to-one decision, the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, held that CGL policy language requires application of
the injury-in-fact standard and that the lower court erred in its
application of a discovery standard.2 0 Writing for the court, Jus-
tice Mikoll reasoned that in the two cases relied upon by the lower





20 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635-36. The policy contained
standard CGL policy language, providing that only "'property damage' which occurs
during the policy period" was covered and that "'property damage' must be caused by
an 'occurrence.'" Id. The policy defined "property damage" as "[pihysical injury to
tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property; or... [1loss of
use of tangible property that is not physically injured." Id. The policy defined an "oc-
currence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially
the same general harmful conditions." Id.
21 In determining that coverage was triggered by discovery of the damage, the
trial court relied on Greenlee v. Sherman, 142 A.D.2d 472,536 N.Y.S.2d 877 (3d Dep't
1989) and Miccio v. National Sur. Corp., 170 A.D.2d 937, 566 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't
1991). See Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 119, 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
In Greenlee, the defendant Sherman negligently installed a flue pipe from the
furnace in the plaintiff Greenlee's home, causing an adjacent wooden joist to undergo
pyrolysis, a chemical process that lowers the ignition temperature of the surrounding
wood. Greenlee, 142 A.D.2d at 474, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 878. Four years later, as a result
of its proximity to the furnace, the damaged wood caught fire. Id. Greenlee brought an
action for damages against Sherman, and Sherman's insurer, Hanover Insurance
Company, sought a declaratory judgment stating that it was no longer under a duty to
defend because Sherman's policy had expired before the fire and resulting damage. Id.
at 474, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 879. The court held that the damage to the wooden joist and
the subsequent damage caused by the fire were separate and distinct. Id. at 478, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 881. Therefore, although there was clearly damage during the policy pe-
riod, namely, increased flammability of the wooden joist, the court held that "[hlad
the heat source been removed at any time prior to the fire, no further injury to the
wooden joist would have occurred, and there would have been no fire... ." Id. Since
the damage caused by the fire occurred outside the policy period, and the policy ex-
plicitly covered only damage occurring during the policy period, the insurer was under
no duty to defend the action. Id. at 477, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
In Miecio, a hoisting device was negligently installed in plaintiff Miccio's ice
cream store while defendant National Surety Corporation's ("National") liability pol-
icy was in effect. Mice/o, 170 A.D.2d at 937, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 761. Miccio subsequently
sold the store to Ehmer and the policy was terminated. Id. While Ehmer was in pos-
19941
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tion resulted from an intervening cause that occurred outside the
period of coverage. 22 In Cortland, however, there was no interven-
ing cause-the seepage of the gasoline onto the property of the
adjacent homeowners was itself property damage; the only ques-
tion was when that event occurred.2 3 The court noted that an in-
surer's duty to defend is broader than its obligation to indem-
session of the premises, the hoist failed, killing a deliveryman, whose administratrix
brought a wrongful death action against Ehmer, who in turn brought a third-party
action against Miccio. Id. Miccio sought a declaratory judgment against National es-
tablishing that the injury was covered under National's policy. Id. The court held
that the coverage-triggering event was the deliveryman's death, which occurred after
the policy had been terminated. The policy language specified that only occurrences
during the policy period were covered and, therefore, National was under no obliga-
tion to defend in the wrongful death action. Id. at 938, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
22 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636. In denying coverage under
the policies, Greenlee and Miccio distinguished damage resulting later from an acci-
dent occurring during the period of coverage from damage that results from a condi-
tion created during the period of coverage; these courts mandated coverage in the
former situation but not the latter. See Miccio, 170 A.D.2d at 938, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
762; Greenlee, 142 A.D.2d at 478, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
In Greenlee, the negligent installation of the flue pipe caused the wood to undergo
pyrolysis thereby creating the condition that caused the fire; the fire was the resulting
"accident" from the continued exposure to the intense heat of the furnace that consti-
tuted the occurrence for purposes of the coverage-triggering event. Greenlee, 142
A.D.2d at 478, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 881. "[T]he policy does not provide coverage for injury
sustained after the expiration of the policy period as the result of a condition created
during the policy period." Id.
In Miccio, the negligent installation of the hoisting device created the conditions
under which an accident could occur, but it was the actual failure of the device that
was held to constitute an occurrence for purposes of triggering policy coverage. Miccio,
170 A.D.2d at 938, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
23 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120-21, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The court noted that the
policy defined an "occurrence" to include "continuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general harmful conditions." Id. at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citing
Matychak v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 181 A.D.2d 957, 958, 581 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (3d
Dep't) (holding that injury resulting from contamination of drinking water by oil spill
on neighboring property need not be discovered during policy period to trigger cover-
age), leave denied, 80 N.Y.2d 758, 602 N.E.2d 1125, 589 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1992)). In con-
trast, the court in Van Wyck Assoc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 Misc. 2d
447, 454 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982), aff'd, 95 A.D.2d 989, 454
N.Y.S.2d 617 (2d Dep't 1983), stated:
"[Blodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury sustained by any person which
occurs during the policy period."... It appears that the policy does not in-
dude mere exposure to "conditions" existent during the policy period .... It
is true that insurance policies are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer, but when the policy provisions are
clear and unambiguous they must be given their plain and ordinary
meaning.
Id. at 450-51, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70 (citations omitted).
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nify,24 and while the complaint did not specifically allege that
injury-in-fact occurred during the coverage period, it did not ex-
clude that possibility.25 Since it was possible that the damage re-
sulting from the seepage of gasoline onto the adjacent property
occurred within the period of coverage, the court held that sum-
mary judgment for the defendant insurer was improper, and that
Firemen's was obligated to defend Cortland against the third-
party actions.26
The court's analysis of the occurrence problem and its adop-
tion of the injury-in-fact theory answers satisfactorily the question
of whether the insurer has a duty to defend. 7 Left unaddressed,
24 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 121, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The "duty... to defend
[CGL policies] is exceedingly broad,... 'far broader than any ultimate liability to
indemnify.'" (quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 177 A.D.2d
61, 65, 581 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (1st Dep't 1992), affd, 80 N.Y.2d 640, 609 N.E.2d 506,
593 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1993).
25 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 121, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citing Continental Casualty,
177 A.D.2d at 65, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (quoting Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
790 F.2d 119, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986))). Even if the insured does not specifically allege
that the property damage occurred within the policy period, "well-settled principles of
New York law" dictate that the insured "is entitled to a defense by the insurance
company] if the underlying tort complaints 'permit proof' of the facts establishing
coverage, or if the complaints do not exclude the possibility that injury-in-fact oc-
curred during the policy period]' Abex, 790 F.2d at 128-29 (citation omitted).
26 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 121, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The majority, however, held
that Firemen's was obligated to defend only against the two third-party actions and
not in the direct action commenced by Petr-All because the direct action fell within
the policy's pollution exclusion. Id. at 121-22, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
Justice Mercure concurred separately as to Firemen's obligation to defend Cort-
land against the third-party actions. See id. at 122, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (Mercure, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). Mercure dissented, however, to the appli-
cation of the policy's pollution exclusion clause in the direct action by Petr-All. Id. The
general rule in New York is that an insurer has no duty to defend "unless the underly-
ing action is based on both a sudden and accidental discharge of waste materials....
[T]he relevant factor is ... whether the toxic material was discharged into the envi-
ronment unexpectedly and unintentionally or knowingly and intentionally." 1 FREED-
m4aN, supra note 1, § 5:2[d], at 350-52. The policy in Cortland provided that the pollu-
tion exclusion clause would not apply if "[any loss, cost or expense incurred as a
result of any 'clean-up' of 'pollutants' is not the result of a governmental directive or
request." Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 122, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (Mercure, J., dissenting).
Petr-Al's obligation to investigate and redress any damages from the discharge of
gasoline did not necessarily result from the DEC's notice, see supra note 14 and ac-
companying text, but arguably resulted from Petr-All's duties under N.Y. NAy. LAw
§ 181(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994), which imposes strict liability for all cleanup
expenses and direct and indirect damages caused by the discharge. Cortland, 194
A.D.2d at 122, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (Mercure, J., dissenting). Justice Mercure, there-
fore, would have found Firemen's obligated to defend in Cortland, the direct action by
Petr-All, as well as the third-party actions. Id. at 122-23, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
27 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635-36.
1994]
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however, is the issue of whether the insurer is liable to indemnify
the insured, because it is still undetermined at what point in time
the property damage actually occurred, and thus whether the in-
jury occurred within the policy period. It has been argued that the
injury-in-fact theory may not be the ideal solution to every occur-
rence problem,2" and that the standard applied should reflect the
nature of the claim involved and the individual circumstances of
the case.29 It is submitted that the injury-in-fact theory is inap-
propriate when property damage results from leakage of hazard-
ous material from one property to another, because of the difficul-
ties in determining the precise time that the injury actually
occurred to the property.
The Cortland court acknowledged that there is no controlling
authority in New York on the issue of when property damage
caused by hazardous material contamination triggers insurance
coverageY ° In applying the injury-in-fact theory, the court relied
on New York personal injury cases, in which the moment of the
28 See Scheuermann, supra note 5, at 779. The injury-in-fact theory can be said to
merely restate the issue of when coverage is triggered, because defining injury-in-fact
in terms of the point at which property damage actually occurs necessitates a deter-
mination of what constitutes property damage. See id. at 777. Furthermore, the ac-
tual time of injury is not always a simple determination, particularly when the dam-
age or injury was sustained prior to its manifestation. See, e.g., American Home
Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd
as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). Although it applied an injury-in-fact stan-
dard to a bodily injury action involving DES, the court in American Home Products
noted that "[diepending upon the facts of each case, the drug involved, the period and
intensity of exposure, and the person affected, an injury may occur... upon exposure,
at some point in time after exposure but before manifestation of the injury, and at
manifestation." Id.
In the context of the facts of Cortland, an injury-in-fact analysis would require a
determination of (1) the point in time at which the gasoline began to leak from the
broken joint, (2) the amount of time it took for the gasoline to travel from the broken
joint to the adjacent property, as affected by the characteristics of the ground beneath
the gas station pumps and the homes, and (3) the amount of time before the leak
caused sufficient damage to the property to warrant compensation. Since three sepa-
rate properties were damaged in Cortland, coverage would be triggered at different
times for each; coverage for the damage to Petr-All would conceivably be triggered
before coverage for the damage to the adjacent properties. The damage sustained by
Petr-All most likely occurred immediately upon leakage from the pump, whereas the
gasoline had to travel underground before reaching and causing damage to the resi-
dential properties.
29 Cf Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636 ("[G]enerally an insur-
ance contract 'must be construed in its entirety with reference to the subject matter
and the nature of the risk involved'") (quoting 69 N.Y. Jur. 2D Insurance § 699 (1988).
30 Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 120, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
772 [Vol. 68:765
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
injury-causing event could be determined."1 Recently, in Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,"2 which involved property
damage to buildings from asbestos exposure, the Second Circuit,
applying New York law, adopted a "damage-in-fact" theory to de-
termine when property damage occurred, thereby triggering cov-
erage.3 That court, however, distinguished asbestos property
31 See id. at 120-21, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 635. In Matychak v. Security Mut. Ins. Co.,
181 A.D.2d 957, 581 N.Y.S.2d 453, (3d Dep't), leave denied, 80 N.Y.2d 758, 602 N.E.2d
1125, 589 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1992), the court held that an occurrence took place within the
policy period when the injured party drank water that had been contaminated by an
oil spill while the policy was in effect, even though the injured party did not discover
that she had ingested contaminated water until after the policy expired. Id. at 958,
581 N.Y.S. 2d at 454.55. In Continental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 80
N.Y.2d 640, 609 N.E.2d 506, 593 N.Y.S. 2d 966, (1993), an asbestos case, the New
York Court of Appeals applied an injury-in-fact standard to hold that the insurer had
a duty to defend when it was possible that the injured party contracted the disease
during the period of coverage, regardless of when the illness was discovered. Id. at
650-52, 609 N.E.2d at 510-12, 593 N.Y.S. 2d at 970-72.
In National Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 128 AD.2d 332, 515
N.Y.S.2d 267 (2d Dep't 1987), the court held that under a "Comprehensive Law En-
forcement Liability Policy" the insurer was obligated to defend when the insured po-
lice department was sued for false arrest and false imprisonment, even though the
arrest was made before coverage began because the party instituting the action had
been incarcerated during the period of coverage. Id. at 336-37, 515 N.Y.S. 2d at 270.
While the National Casualty court stated that 'the sustaining of specified injuries
during the policy period" was the triggering event, it noted that 'there is nothing in
the policy which requires, as a prerequisite to ascertaining whether there is coverage,
that the injury resulting from a causative event be reduced to a single or fixed occur-
rence in time." Id. Justice Mikoll's reliance on the National Casualty case in Cort-
land, 194 A.D.2d at 121, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 636, is perplexing because the National
Casualty court relied in part on Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., a leading
continuous trigger case. See National Casualty, 128 A.D.2d at 337, 515 N.Y.S.2d at
270; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1992).
32 23 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994). W.R. Grace &
Co., a manufacturer of asbestos products, was sued by over seventeen thousand indi-
viduals for personal injuries resulting from inhalation of asbestos, and by over two
hundred building owners for property damage caused by installation of asbestos prod-
ucts in their buildings. W.R. Grace, 23 F.3d at 620.
33 Id. at 626. The court stated that "property damage insurance should be treated
the same as insurance for bodily injury, which under New York law is governed by an
'injury-in-fact' trigger," id. at 624, and also that New York had adopted an injury-in-
fact trigger for property damage cases. Id. at 625 (citing Cortland, 194 A.D.2d at 121,
604 N.Y.S.2d at 636). In adopting the injury-in-fact standard, the court noted that
insurance policies covering liability for property damage and for personal injury de-
fined the term "occurrence" using similar language. Id. Additionally, the court re-
jected a discovery theory for determining at what point damage-in-fact occurred. Id.
at 627. The court distinguished the measure of damages from the damages them-
selves; a "reduction in marketability" is an indicator used to assess damages, but does
not constitute property damage in itself. Id. In W.R. Grace, damage, measured by the
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damage from the type of property damage at issue in Cortland by
noting that "asbestos property damage is unlike the gradual leak-
ing of hazardous waste from a landfill .... Once installed, the
damage that asbestos inflicts is complete."3 4 Similarly, the Elev-
enth Circuit applied the injury-in-fact rule in deciding a case
under New York law, and held that property damage to a home,
which resulted from a fire caused by the leakage of gas from a
negligently installed gas grill, was distinguishable from "cases in-
volving exposure to harmful chemicals during the policy period."3
5
reduction in marketability, occurred upon installation of the asbestos in the buildings.
Id.
34 W.R. Grace, 23 F.3d at 628. "Some types of property damage-such as the
gradual contamination of earth and groundwater by leaking landfills-may be analo-
gous to the slow progression of diseases such as asbestosis and cancer." Id. at 627
(citing New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 809 (D. DeL
1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1846 (1993)). In New
Castle, the court applied the continuous trigger theory espoused in Keene to deter-
mine the triggering event in a property damage action based on landfill pollution
leakage. 725 F. Supp. at 812-13.
Similarly, in Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986),
the Fourth Circuit adopted a manifestation theory in a hazardous waste leakage case,
stating that "[d]etermining exactly when [hazardous waste] damage begins can be
difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 1328. The W.R. Grace court distinguished Mraz,
noting that, in an asbestos property damage case, damage occurs upon installation of
the asbestos, and therefore, the exact moment in time when damage occurred is more
readily ascertainable. W.R. Grace, 23 F.3d at 627-28; see Continental Ins. Cos. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1192 n.29 (8th Cir. 1987)
(suggesting that continuous trigger standard may be appropriate where it is impossi-
ble to determine when damage occurred), aff'd as modified, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.
1988)).
The court in New Castle stated that "[clourts that have adopted [the injury-in-
fact] standard in a continuous injury context have had to abandon a precise determi-
nation of when injury in fact did occur because of the evidentiary problems posed."
New Castle, 725 F. Supp. at 811. As discussed earlier, see supra note 28, the precise
moment when the homeowners' properties were damaged by the leaking gasoline in
Cortland would be extremely difficult to ascertain, but would nevertheless be essen-
tial to determine liability because the negligent act occurred only one month before
the policy expired.
35 Young v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 870 F.2d 610, 611 (11th Cir. 1989). In Young,
a real estate developer negligently installed a gas barbecue grill in the rear of a home
in 1984, allegedly resulting in a gas leak. Id. at 610. Two years later, the homeowner
sued the developer claiming that the negligent installation of the gas grill caused a
fire in 1986, and the developer sought to have his insurer defend him in the action
brought by the homeowner. Id. The court determined that the fire was the "occur-
rence" for which the policy provided coverage. Id. at 611-12. The court held that the
fire occurred after the policy had expired and therefore the insurer was under no obli-
gation to defend the insured. Id. at 611-12. It is submitted that the facts of Young are
more analogous to those of Greenlee v. Sherman, 142 A.D.2d 472, 536 N.Y.S.2d 877
(3d Dep't 1989) and Miccio v. National Sur. Corp., 170 A.D.2d 937, 566 N.Y.S.2d 760
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It has been argued that the continuous trigger theory is more
appropriate in property damage cases that are factually analogous
to progressive injury situations, such as hazardous waste leakage,
rather than ordinary property damage cases. 6 A suitable com-
parison to the facts of Cortland arose in Gottlieb v. Newark Insur-
ance Co.,37 in which the court held that under New Jersey law, a
continuous trigger theory was applicable to property damage
caused by the migration of pesticides from one part of a home to
another.38  The continued migration over a period of years consti-
tuted continuous injury which could trigger coverage not only in
the first year of exposure and damage, but also in later years
under different insurance policies.3 9 Similarly, in Montrose Chem-
(3d Dep't 1991), than to those of Cortland, and the Young court properly distinguished
property damage caused by the fire from the conditions that led to the fire. See Young,
870 F.2d at 611-12.
36 Arness & Eliason, supra note 1, at 972-73.
[In the great majority of cases, property damage is not like a cancerous
growth-it does not become worse with time.... In a certain class of prop-
erty damage cases factually more analogous to the progressive bodily injury
situation, however, the continuous trigger may be appropriate. When chem-
icals from an improperly constructed toxic waste landfill leach slowly into
adjacent property, for instance, new property may be affected with each
passing day, while the damage to already affected property, and the associ-
ated costs of remedy, may increase steadily as well.
Id. at 972-73 (footnotes omitted); see also Davis J. Howard, "Continuous Trigger"Lia-
bility: Application to Toxic Waste Cases and Impact on the Number of "Occurrences,"
22 TORT & INs. L.J. 624, 629-30 (1987) (predicting that courts may use continuous
trigger theory in toxic waste cases because "bodily injury and property damage caused
by toxic waste develop over time"); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation,
99 HARv. L. REv. 1458, 1581 (1986) (stating that, in cases involving property damage
from hazardous waste, "occurrence is continuous, extending from disposal to manifes-
tation of the damage.") (footnote omitted). But see Savoy Medical Supply Co. v. F & H
Mfg. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 703, 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying New York law and hold-
ing that injury-in-fact standard more accurately reflects policy language and expecta-
tions of parties regarding insurance coverage than does manifestation theory).
37 570 A.2d 443 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
38 Id. at 446. In Gottlieb, the homeowners (the "Gottliebs") sued the defendant
Apex Pest Control ("Apex") for property damage suffered when toxic chemicals ap-
plied to the exterior, basement, and crawl space of the Gottliebs' home in May 1982 by
Apex were found to have migrated, in subsequent years, to different rooms in the
house. Id. at 444. While the court held that "the continuous trigger theory reflects the
law in New Jersey," its application is fact sensitive and should be carefully applied.
Id. at 446.
39 Id. at 446. Apex's policy had a liability limit of $25,000 in 1982, which in-
creased to $50,000 in 1983 and to $1,000,000 in 1984 and 1985. Id. at 444. Thus, the
insured could benefit from the higher policy limits if at trial it was determined that
the property damage was sustained in the later policy years. One commentator has
noted this benefit of multiple limits, but also recognized the offset of multiple deduct-
ibles. See Howard, supra note 36, at 631, 636. The court indicated, however, that an
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ical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,40 the California Court of Ap-
peal adopted a continuous trigger standard to find all insurers of a
chemical manufacturer potentially liable to defend and indemnify
for real property damage caused by contamination from hazard-
ous waste.4 ' In Gruol Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America,42 the Washington Court of Appeals held that all insurers
of a building contractor during the period of time when the foun-
dation of an apartment building underwent dry rot as a result of
defective backfilling during construction were liable to defend and
indemnify the insured building contractor.43
Although it has been said that the injury-in-fact trigger the-
ory reflects the plain meaning of the CGL policy language and has
been adopted by the New York courts in a variety of situations,'
it is not the better alternative when the exact moment in time that
damage occurred is prohibitively difficult or impossible to deter-
mine.45 In these limited situations, the continuous trigger theory,
insured or homeowner whose delay in giving notice of the damage enabled the harm
to worsen may be estopped and recovery precluded. Id. at 446-47.
40 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. Ct. App.), petition for review granted, 862 P.2d 661
(Cal. 1992).
41 Montrose, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369. The court noted that there is a difference
between the reasonable expectations of an insured under a third-party liability policy,
such as that in Cortland, and the expectations of an insured under a first-party policy.
Id. at 336. First-party coverage is designed to cover the insured's known maximum
potential loss, whereas the insured in the third-party coverage context is guessing at
potential losses. Id. at 366. Thus, third-party policy holders naturally expect coverage
under multiple policies for continuous damage. Id.; see also California Union Ins. Co.
v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983) (apply-
ing continuous trigger theory, court held that property damage caused by leakage
from swimming pool over 18 month period triggered coverage under insurance policy
in effect at start of leakage and also under policy in effect when leak was discovered).
42 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
43 Id. at 430. In Gruol, the plaintiff building contractor, through its negligence
during the construction of an apartment building in 1963, caused the box sills of the
building to undergo dry rot, and the building's owner sued for damages discovered in
1968. Id. at 429. After the insurers refused to defend against the owner's action, the
contractor settled the claim and then brought an action against the insurers for
breach of contract. Id. The court held that the "occurrence" that each policy covered
need not be a single isolated event, but could be a process, and that all insurers dur-
ing the time period of that process were jointly and severally liable and obligated to
defend. Id. at 430. Furthermore, the court placed the burden on the insurers of appor-
tioning the loss among themselves. Id. at 431.
44 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing injury-in-fact trigger
theory).
45 Interestingly, some of the courts that have applied the continuous trigger the-
ory in progressive damage situations acknowledged that the injury-in-fact standard
for determining when an occurrence took place was normally utilized. See, e.g., Cali-
fornia Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 465 (Cal. Ct. App.
[Vol. 68:765
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
while not universally accepted, may best reflect the insured's ex-
pectation of coverage in the context of continuous progressive
property damage.
Kevin D. Lewis
1983) (noting that its use of continuous trigger standard is departure from normal
standard of "time when the complaining party is actually damaged"); Gottlieb v. New-
ark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (acknowledging that
New Jersey courts usually define occurrence as "time when complaining party was
damaged"). Thus, the fact that New York courts generally find that injury-in-fact
triggers policy coverage should not preclude the application of a different standard in
an appropriate case such as Cortland.
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